

METAPHENOMENALISM

We are now working under
the rubric of
metaphenomenalism!

Are animal phenomena
the same as human
phenomena?

Probably Not!

But do they use them in a
similar manner?

According to Solms [again, useful book already
referenced a couple of times above] all minds as such
in diagram one and two have a PAG. A periaqueductal
grey that has an effect we call feelings in relation to
the flow of energy to and from the body by way of the

brain stem. This seems to open up the possibility for metaphenomenalists to suggest to each other that the body below the neck is somewhat open to feelings that get linked to phenomena that appear to the mind. This would seem to open up the chance for Freud's use of the phenomena ego and id as recognising the neck as separating the senses of the body per se insofar as it appears to us phenomenally, from the audiovisual senses that none the less provide more phenomena than a body can shake a stick at.

When and if we do articulate those phenomena we have available in our storage of phenomena, as Solms has suggested we can, it does seem that the body is the part of the mind that creates felt phenomena, feelings, that are relatively difficult to articulate other than say articulating the body again. This is like putting one's hand in the fire again in order to find out if it still hurts a lot and chars the skin. Donna Harraway [DH] has done quite a bit of work on this sort of puzzle¹¹. The notion of the audio-visual recorder [AVR] as a concept of work in progress on cognitive neuroscience by workers such as Lakoff for example¹² demonstrate what we have managed to make appear to us as phenomena, that we can then articulate by mind as this concept of mind, mind. There are billions of neurons rather than brains as organs, and neurons grow together when and if they work together¹³. Thus, the energy flow in the mind, of

¹¹ Haraway D, *The Companion Species Manifesto*, Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003.

¹² Lakoff G, *Women Fire and Dangerous Things*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1990.

¹³ Cobb M, *The Idea of the Brain*, Profile Books, 2020.

a living being with the necessary parts, is measured, says Solms, for good for me bad for me units on a scale of don't care, right up to can't bear it, and can't live without it, as Solms reports this PAG at work.

Metaphenomenalists will of course question the phenomena not the reports. We must use the concept as it is for Ryle, not as it is used in the statistical normative use of word phenomena right now.

The mind is biological and geological and phenomenal in a process much as Whitehead tried to sort out¹⁴ but failed to do so because he forgot or did not realise the irony of reporting using words.

Neither did Freud get the irony although he got this issue of the subconscious mind having to deal with reality a lot, leaving the conscious mind to deal with the bits the PAG starts going on about so to speak, alerts the mind to the problem.

The irony then is that the phenomena are only appearances, and they are presumably species specific appearances – that is work for the biologists perhaps – not much I can write about that. But as to the use of phenomena, as metaphenomenalists we can make use of our words to say that an existential phenomenal construct [EPC] is required in order to express in words what we are willing to express of our feelings about this separation between the subconscious and conscious parts of mind, bearing in mind that we have no reality to rely on and that other animals may well

¹⁴ Sherburne DW, 1966, *A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality*, Indiana University Press, 1981
Brumbaugh RS, Whitehead, *Process Philosophy, and education*, State University of New York Press, 1982.

have existential phenomenal constructs using their very own phenomena unique to them, but not word phenomena as per DH.

Furthermore, it does seem obvious to me that Freud's ego and id¹⁵ are themselves concepts each in need of an EPC, and that just as we cannot but invent, imagine, make an EPC for our own ego this will inevitably be different from one made by another mind, and very different from one made by another species. Just as the id is the animal in Freud, but an irony in the case of humans.

In case you hadn't noticed, the splitting of the mind Freud did, leads to this schizophrenia word issue that Guattari for example, jumped on in his work¹⁶. The concept of mind Ryle was writing about way back¹⁷ was an attempt to avoid such schizophrenic breaks and it is far more likely they are caused by willing two separate EPC's, one for ego, one for id, just as adding another EPC for the brain, as mind, produces the controversies over rationalisation and relativity that have made it possible for me to reverse the statistically normative use of irony to the one on the front cover.

On the evidence, say, from Elias¹⁸, our human use of will and representation [of our feelings], **not quite** as someone wrote earlier¹⁹, allows us to use words to

¹⁵ Freud S, The Ego & The Id, Dover Thrift, 2018.

¹⁶ Guattari F, Soft Subversions, Semiotext, 2009.

¹⁷ Ryle G, 1949, The Concept of Mind, Penguin, 1990.

¹⁸ Elias N, The History of Manners, Pantheon Books, NY, 1978.

¹⁹ Schopenhauer A, 1819, The World as Will and Representation, volume I, Dover Publications, New York, 1969

report on statistical norms, as do numbers, such that we can use the same EPC's as I outlined in my book *Learn*²⁰, linking well with Labov's data. An outstanding problem arises however, when and if we do not realise the artificial characteristics of the EPC's as well as their effective usage when there is a distinct need for communicative praxis and communicatives of AVR's capable of participating in the free statistically normative usage of them. This problem has become known as multiculturalism and it has to be re-badged by metaphenomenalists as the problem of multiple EPC's when either the will to be heterogeneous is lacking in the animals in question, or the usage of the EPC is insisted upon and imposed upon the will of animals against their free will to make use of their very own, so to speak.

And.

Any notion such as that of say Schopenhauer, that the world can be at all represented using phenomena in any EPC made by any AVR is incoherent given the complexity of the Cosmos as it is appearing to us in the 21st century. This is not because the Cosmos is getting more complex, but that the complexity of the unknown is becoming more profoundly apparent to us by way of our patient reporting on what appears to those who bother to experience its profundity. Latour is a good example of the frustration caused when the irony of the human condition is not fully

Schopenhauer A, 1844, *The World as Will and Representation*, volume II, Dover Publications, New York, 1969

²⁰ Thompson B, *Learn*, Paperback ISBN: 9781784567507, 2020.

understood²¹. All of us without exception, and most of us even when we do try to understand in more profound ways, merely make our EPC's from the phenomenal milieu made from what appears to us individually. The notion of the paradigm as a concept arises from this difficulty with arriving at an understanding by sharing one EPC made of suitable phenomena for sharing, but not for reporting or describing experiences.

Two individuals have provided some help with our understanding of the EPC and the magic so to speak of the word as a phenomenon of remarkable clarity in use and in theory, almost but not quite as good as numbers, and coins as the two combined, words with numbers, assisting us in the minute and even paltry transactions we carry out between us as animals. One of these two individuals is Thomas Kuhn²², the other is Adorno²³. The legacy of their work is linked to the errors of philosophy before we switch to metaphenomenalism and quantum philosophy. The latter being just a term for the philosophical approach required of metaphenomenalists dealing with the transactional as commensurate and incommensurate. Transactions being attempts to share understandings between willing participants. This is what Dewey was vaguely aware of²⁴. And we metaphenomenalists must note the tragedy of the irony involved in large

²¹ Latour B, Facing Gaia, Polity, 2017.

²² Kuhn TS, 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Uni of Chicago, 1975.

²³ Adorno T W, 1969, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, Harper Torchbooks, New York, San Francisco, 1976 English translation..

²⁴ Rorty R, 1982, Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

numbers of participants believing sharing one EPC is a sign of its validity. A good example of this is a dictionary, and this irony has been raised by those studying literature such as Barthes²⁵. The irony is that just as our words, numbers, and coins [as combinations of words and numbers] allow us to share what Adorno called systems, of great scale with many participants, they reduce the capacity of the minds involved to change their minds' expressions to suit themselves individually as to their feelings, and use of phenomena, so producing and sharing EPC's.

²⁵ Barthes R, *Image, Music, Text*, 1977, Fontana Press.