


# Examples of Irony.

## Diagram One.

### *The Mind Model*



Especially in the Anglo-American speaking world persons speak of the mind. this seems to be a part of the Enlightenment project so called.

This enlightenment project depends a great deal on the work of the philosopher Immanuel Kant [1724 to 1804] and also the work of Francis Bacon [1561-1626] as to reporting on experimental experiences. More recently it depends upon the work of the less

well-known William Labov [1927- ]. In particular Labov's work demonstrates the irony of words, being a study of word users as an anthropological study; a study of beings using words as if they are real, signifying what they believe to be real. In particular, that in a past life, things were much better.

The issue here is what are the things?

Immanuel Kant, on whose words modernity in the form of enlightenment science is based, made it clear that we could not know things in themselves. We could not know reality. All we could know were phenomena.

The word phenomenon has not caught on, has been used more to express surprise, abnormality perhaps, such as "the experience was phenomenal".

Perhaps because phenomenon is a fancy word to use to replace the word thing. Some, and there are masses of speakers like this it seems, who fancy they are pragmatic and earthy and down to earth. Those who do not comprehend the irony of saying 'such talk is abstract, reductive', whilst using words to express their opinions about the use of fancy words over common words such as things.

So, if we accept we are not being what Labov might call statistically normative users of words regarding word use by the masses of speakers speaking words we could, and should, use the word phenomenon for what we can know. Based on Kant's work. Adorno, in

his negative dialectic<sup>2</sup>, called such fancy speakers ‘intellectuals’ but to avoid this as a stigmatising quasi-racist concept I am going to use the word metaphenomenalist, because metaphenomenalists know the truth about words, they are phenomena along with all other appearances in the mind.

Based on Bacon’s reporting on experimental experiences, we should adopt the use of Kant’s phenomena for what appears to scientists [who are mortal like us are they not?]. So, the work of all scientists would report on phenomena using what?

Like us would they not use the marks on paper and drawings and numbers? And essentially, do these body movements of scientists differ from the body movements of other animals such as dogs, cats, and giraffes? And do these other animals have central nervous systems? And do they not report of experimental experiences?

That last sentence is what we might not be sure of all the time, but some of the time surely? Like us all, we have some experimental experiences above and beyond what Labov noted as normative experiences [as reported on as ‘statistically normal’ by anthropologists reporting on our 5000 or so cultures]. So, the mewling of cats, the expressions on the faces of giraffes, and the barking of dogs, is all the same kind of phenomenon as us using our words, in that all these appearances appear as phenomena.

---

<sup>2</sup> Adorno T, 2003, *Negative Dialectics*, Polity Press, 2008.

Now going back a few years to the work of Gilbert Ryle, and his comment on mind as a phenomenon used in connection with a reality that we might put our hands on, he thought not. Ryle believed mind was like our word university. When that appears to us, that word university, some statistically normative word users right now believe it is a building. But Ryle pointed out it was a concept, another fancy word that annoys lots of word users, but not metaphenomenalists!

And yet, because phenomenal, appearing to us, we can use the word mind as not the Central Nervous System [the CNS in Diagram One] but as the whole diagram. So, the phenomena, the bio and the geo and the central nervous system all working together as mind. Then we could say that all animals with a CNS have minds that are combinations of bio, geo, and phenomena processed by that combination as a whole – a suitable word might be being, a being, a living being perhaps?

In all such cases the storage of phenomena would be, so it seems in the CNS. Storage is a crude word to use but will do for us. And according to Solms<sup>3</sup> recent work on the CNS, the feelings living beings acting as minds, feel, and the phenomena that appear to minds, are ineluctably linked by the CNS, and according to Damasio<sup>4</sup> are ineluctably guided by ongoing combinations of phenomena and feelings that Solms reports, saying that the body of the animal using

---

<sup>3</sup> Solms M, *The Hidden Spring*, 2021, Profile Books.

<sup>4</sup> Damasio A R, *The Strange Order of Things*, Vintage Books, New York, 2018.

Damasio's reported dynamic homeostasis works as a subconscious mind, and whenever the feelings prompt the mind to do so it will create a milieu of phenomena that 'we must deal with consciously'.

What I get from this is that my subconscious mind, as in diagram one, seems to be dealing with the biological geological phenomenal relationships as if it is at home in reality, whereas what the mind that I am conscious of deals with phenomenal milieu and feelings as best it can. Note the irony that because words are phenomena, my conscious mind cannot deal with reality per se, which is what Kant the philosopher pointed out quite clearly<sup>5</sup>, but forgot, it seems, please correct me if wrong, that the subconscious mind can and does and has to deal with reality. I think Freud 'got that' in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, by the way<sup>6</sup>.

---

<sup>5</sup> Henrich D, 1992, *Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World*, Stanford Uni Press, 1995.

<sup>6</sup> Freud S, 1901, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, London, Benn, 1966.