
The Evolution of the Conscious Mind. Diagram Two. *The CNS as Phenomenal Milieu*.



Our new model of mind in the Anglo-American speaking world needs a rubric under which to work. At the moment most people on the planet believe they 'speak reality'. As Kant point out the best we can do is act in the real subliminally perhaps, but when speaking we speak of what appears to us, and those are phenomena. The best the mind can manage is to provide a speaker with a phenomenal milieu. We can assume dogs, cats, and giraffes all get the same break in life that we humans do as living beings in an unknown that is insoluciant to them perhaps. They and us all get to play with phenomena, unless we let go of wanting to be using the conscious mind, and I find this is not often an option I care to pursue, unless I am feeling super confident, and that varies on how I understand what appears to me at any time. Cats often appear super confident, but then they have nine lives. I try to be a little more cautious.

[spoiler here is that only humans have what we humans normatively call words according to Bickerton⁷, not so much Everett⁸. However, the Bickerton and McWhorter version⁹ regarding vocabularies and dictionaries and encyclopaedias work better with the evolutionary model of how on earth we animals in general got on earth so to speak. What this work better might be like is that we humans can articulate phenomenal milieu to match experiences and normalise them more than other animals by using word phenomena].

So ignoring the spoiler for now, it would seem not unreasonable to suppose the subliminal or biological geological links with what appears to animals is real

⁷ Bickerton D, 1990, Language and Species, Uni of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1992.

⁸ Everett D, How Language Began, Profile Books, 2018.

⁹ McWhorter J, What Language Is, Gotham Books, 2012.

up to the point when animals can have phenomena appear to them at will so to speak. To will phenomena from the storage of phenomena and articulate them according to their will. This notion of mind as all of the above, and the subliminal reality, falters however once any phenomena appear to an animal that are not in the flow of experiences of the immediate moment. And yet because we cannot know reality, we cannot know what an immediate moment is, or is like, other than as it appears to us but then what is that like? So here I believe is this clear indication of the Irony as on the front cover of this book. We use words to create something we then try to get to know forgetting we have created it using words themselves that appear to us as phenomena.

The whole advantage of the phenomena appearing is that this is in effect a report on a possibly, probably insouciant unknown, not reality itself, that is Kant's point of course. According to Solms¹⁰, which is helplful to metaphenomenalists, he reports that all animals that have audio-visual senses have this phenomenal milieu that they must have a relationship with. So when and if animals have minds, we can, can we, assume some abilities to articulate phenomena. What does this mean for our own use of phenomena? Surely not all phenomena are the same. Surely they must differ from animal to animal as phenomena even though the insouciant unknown is, well, unknown.

¹⁰ Solms M, The Hidden Spring, 2021, Profile Books.