## The 'Minding' of Phenomena?

I cannot speak to the biology of what we are that much, [I can provide a few reference works on the parts that appear to those doing biology and neuroscience for example<sup>26</sup>] but I can speak to the appearances we metaphenomenalists seek to account for. The point is not to leave physics of geology and move to a physics of the biology but to deal with the flow of data, energy, chemicals, howsover we want to share an understanding of movement providing phenomena as a product of that movement. The great pluralism of the flow of data, energy, chemicals. All of this movement at the sub molecular, not to mention the sub-atomic raised by Al Khalili<sup>27</sup> does link very much with my existential plane and action plane and the Janus core of what I will call 'minding', based on Ryles critique of consciousness, in my third self published book 'Play'. But for now, I want to speak about Kuhn's Paradigm as a metaphor of the minding that is going on for a mind, the whole relationship of life with experience so to speak.

Kuhn's Paradigm May be Useful to Understanding as a kind of Pragmatism and Professionalism towards Living a life as metaphenomenalists.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See the you tube links in this chapter that follow as to neuroscience

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Al-Khalili J, Life on the Edge, Black Swan, 2014

Yes, metaphenomenalism is a new word. I mentioned it may need us to shift to minding and coming to mind as a replacement of the concept of objectivity and subject<sup>28</sup>. I use it to formalise my research using metaphenomenalism as a rubric so that others can join in and develop the theory and practice of it as a belief in the insouciance of energy that is, was, or can be quantitively understood at various scales of becoming as such, by minding, having phenomena appear to minding in various ways, and minding as linking to feelings as important or not, especially when as if committed to its becoming in those ways of 'minding' on the basis of feelings felt as a consequence of doing so [of committing to those becomings and not, for example, other becomings that may or may not have been, now are, and sooner or later might be possible].

Another, less wordy version could be; if this is the kind of thing you like to be minding about then you'll like minding about this sort of thing.

I quickly found out a few years ago nobody seems to like the word metaphenomenalism. So I added the concept of quantum philosophy, because nearly everybody seems to quite like those words and will then listen to what I would have to say had they liked minding metaphenomenalism as much as they liked minding philosophy. Such, as some say, is life.

My feeling here is that many arguments are caused by beliefs and claims based upon what cannot be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> As for example Metzinger speaks of in Metzinger T, The Ego Tunnel, 2009, Basic Books, 2010.

phenomenalised, what people refuse to bring to mind or allow to come to mind. None the less, phenomena do come to mind because as in the diagram Two the mind is a concept and not a thing. It is the working space so to speak between the back door of history and the front door of future action. What I have called the Janus core, the working space of the whole concept. I will speak more about this in later chapters because it relates to the Copenhagen school of metaphysics and its mistake about Husserl and Merleau Ponty. Their mistake is that since phenomenalisations are based on appearances then we are more or less forced to take whatever phenomenalisations become for us. By phenomenalisations I mean just what appears as a clear enough thing to claim not that it could be or is real and possibly meaningful but that we are minding it, of it or rather of them, especially when clear.

## METAPHENOMENALISM

We have feelings because we have them about things that we like when they are 'minded' and this is to say in the Janus working core between history and future. The appearances are the results of processing in our whole mind as are the feelings and yet there is more to it, a relevance to the arrangements of all phenomena that might appear to us this way and that, with an emphasis on the action plane in ordere to explore and experiment and return to how

phenomena appeared [which is in part the golden age issue that Labov found in his data related to word phenomena since word phenomena have this peculiar human unique position as to phenomena – because we as a species make them] And the things occur, appear, minded and minded about, or we can be insouciant to the appearances of them, we could say. They appear as phenomena but/and we infer their being in relationships as they appear to us as we are minding them or as they become minded by us. All of these possibilities have concerned philosophers for millennia as the Gerlach videos, here

https://ericgerlach.com/

and to a lesser extent the Roderick tapes show, here

http://rickroderick.org/

There is no shortage of explanations made over the five thousand years or so ago since we humans got our words. In particular our hands write, but of course before hands it was getting our tongues around words, phenomenalising noises so to speak, so as to speak. And yet, or rather please note, what we speak of are often the phenomenalisations of what we might still call geology, but I would l prefer to call all that 'is' just energy pure and simple and insouciant to whatever forms it takes and whatever forms it takes up when it becomes phenomena at those various scales at which it [the insouciant energy itslelf] does become minded for us as individuals.

In this sense of scales, I can say right now one of those scales seems to be in the neural population that occupies a significant part of the cortex and central nervous system along with a host of accessories that are described in exquisite detail on this web site here https://www.youtube.com/c/NinjaNerdScience as part of that system as a part of what Damasio calls the dynamic homeostasis of the body<sup>29</sup>. But although Damasio knows why Descartes was wrong about perception, as was Helmholtz<sup>30</sup>, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, I have mentioned the geo-chemical and bio-chemical links discovered just ten years ago could not have been known to those working in the earlier centuries. Discoveries such as the geo-chemical and biochemical links,<sup>31</sup> make conversations about evolution rather less important than they were since we can now relate to DNA and RNA as merely part of the huge evolutionary and **developmental relationship** between EPC's, the constructs we make regarding the Janus Core that might be of use to us all. Because of this we must begin to appreciate the developmental relationships between populations of such energy formations [we seem to use the word organism to describe energy formations like us as living beings and more specific words such as dog, horse, and human to describe the more specific energy formations that behave according to those more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Damasio A R, Descartes Error, Picador, 1995.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Meulders M, Helmholtz, MIT, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Lane N, Power, Sex, Suicide, Oxford Uni Press, 2005 Lane N, Oxygen, 2002, Oxford Uni Press, 2009 Lane N, Life Ascending, Profile Books, 2010.

specific words and the forms that generally relate to them. Hold on to this way of phenomenalising since it can fit very well, as it should of course, to what we already do. Note these discoveries are not alternatives to what is happening but alternative understandings!

I say generally. I could say normally, normal that is during the 'minding' in which such forms taken by energy is taken in specific ways for long enough to acquire some sort of 'minding' in relation to normative forms of energy at the scale of words, say, that allow statements such as 'normally a horse is expected to have four legs,' and so and so forth as minded when we 'mind talk about about horses'.

My point is that energy itself is insouciant, or I claim it is since it is pure energy, but when it takes specific shapes such as those of humans and words, as it must as phenomena that appear in the Janus core, in the paradigm, then we should forgive ourselves for believing there is such a thing we can therefore call a world, in which there have been horses and words for them for ever, or so it seems. Later, as with Husserl and Merleau Ponty, I will discuss the Geslalt school that moved from Schleirmacher's Germany to the USA and took the physicalist materialist psychologists with them into a massively populated playground already minded to have a physicalist materialist psychology. We can look at Marcuse's One Dimentional Man<sup>32</sup> for a commentary on that disaster regarding advertising and monetisation. But for now I

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Marcuse H, Towards a Critical Theory of Society, London, Routledge, 2001 Marcuse H, One Dimensional Man, Sphere Books, 1968

will speak of Kuhn's book that he mistakenly called the Structure of Scientific Revolutions even in the second edition of 1969/70, in which he added a postscript to the first publication. In that later version Kuhn admits his use of the word paradigm raised and raises gratuitous difficulties and misunderstanding [a bit like metaphysics then in that regard I believe is it not]. Kuhn attempted to put right those issues that he sort of allowed to occur, pointing out his friend Masterman concluded the word 'paradigm' had been minded 22 different ways, although mostly with only stylistic inconsistancies, rather than generalisations relating to tautological [ends-means] normativities that people had been conditioned to mind about. My point is that there cannot be a floating voter of a 'mind' such as the one the enlightenment science is hung up about, literally on a sky hook of some whole in which the individual subject is a player – much as Wittgenstein got to in his very useful lifetime<sup>33</sup>.

Equally interesting in the same part of his 1969 script Kuhn suggests, I believe correctly, that whilst shared value/s may well be considered a good link to the/any use of the working core of minding, or 'paradigm' to arrive at EPC's minded as beliefs in values, the forms taken and the scales relating those forms that can or could be or have been understood and become normative, remain open, Kuhn points out, to individual feelings and life time experiences, group dynamics, and what he called metaphysics that metaphenomenalists must call experience in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Bloor D, Wittgenstein A Social Theory of Knowledge, The Macmillan Press, 1983.

round or 'minding' experience, allowing the inclusion of differences in the geological and biological and phenomenal minds in which the that and how of any behavioural features of wholes or minds minding experiences might be differentiated on account of the foregoing variables. Note that Rorty heroically struggles with this issue from the old analytical hermeneutics of metaphysics<sup>34</sup> and thus fails to resolve his very well understood [here] denial of irony.

Kuhn opts for shared examples, so that's and how's of an inferred physics, but in and of itself this has to have those who do indeed share the paradigm, the minding in that way. And in pursuing his point Kuhn makes what I believe to be an interesting point about the need for individuals sharing those examples to have been taught the that's and how's of those examples, and that for complex paradigms that would require quite a lot of demonstrations over quite long periods of time. Kuhn raises issues of there needing to be, if, that there are examples of the that's and how's that can be shared, there is a paradigm in place, that can be minded, then Kuhn suggests we could, might, expect tacit knowledge and intuitions to exist within individuals sharing such examples. The point is that if sharing examples over long periods of time then generations of such sharing and we assume caring individuals [caring variably as outlined above copying Kuhn's assertions in his 1969 text] there would be varying degrees of knowledge and skills in using such

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Rorty R, Pragmatism As Anti-Authoritarianism, Belknap Press, 2021.

knowledge amongst the population of the paradigm say. This will of course lead to the next chapter in this book about the pedagogies used to condition and mature the young in any anthropological aka culturalising group of minds<sup>35</sup>.

There would be examples of individuals having implicit and explicit knowledge and skills relating to such paradigms, and a section in his postscript in which he implies that individuals might act like molecules or atoms within groups whose teleological activites can quite easily proliferate in the way [we can say now since the publication of a thousand plateaus] that Deleuze and Guattari suggest is possible in terms of the unseen phenomena in the heads and the seen inferred physics in the hands, inferred by way of appearances in the head rightly or wrongle as linked to some 'reality' or physics.

Two interesting points, amongst others, arise out of Kuhn's contemplations upon the results of his claim and his book on scientific revolutions. The first is what if we were to alter this to that and how revolutions regarding minding and metaphenomenalism? The second is what if this took the wind out of the sails that blew along the good enlightenment ship called 'natural science' and blew more favourably upon notions of work as a form of that insouciant energy, or rather as many forms of it at many different scales of 'minding' with regard specifically to human minding as a species

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Locke J, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 1693, Scolar Press, 1970.

specialisation in word phenomena. In other words, the becoming of all these scales of being, being at scales that gradually open up to humans in ways they could not and had not prior to humans because only humans evolved speaking possibilities and developed them over the past 5000 years. The book Lucy<sup>36</sup> in the chapter on sex I believe, illustrates in words and diagrams how metaphenomenalists [that of course we were at that time anyway as minds] would find themselves linked to those various paradigms and thus to knowledge and skills in using specific knowledge that create what 60,000 years later we now call work/play career opportunities.

Just as anthropologists talk of hunters and gatherers and farmers and priests and kings and queens and soldiers and so on, it is the form taken by energy as human that acquires a career, a profession, as Kuhn himself describes scientists who work under that rubric. But the very notion of a scientific revolution is the same notion as a revolution regarding what we mind about, is it not?

And if the professional is to have a career then there will be a whole paradigm relating to the that and how of the knowledge, the that, and the how, the skills required in relation to the that's, that get us back to the first point about normative values that can be shared on some greater scale, perhaps.

What might that greater scale be for a bunch of energies, or bunches of energy, brought into being at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Johanson DC, Edey MA, Lucy, The Beginnings of Humankind, Penguin, 1981.

the scale of human [using human DNA, along with other bunches of energy brought into being using different DNA at the scale say, of horses, or Donna Haraway's dogs, say] such that say, as my good friend Jean told me there are Mongolian horse tribes that could, from what we can take from Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions, work up by minding about a paradigm of the sort he was envisaging that we call a Mongolian Culture because we can. Other paradigms in the forms very much relating to the thousand plateau<sup>37</sup> examples of Deleuze and Guattari, relating Foucault to Labov, would also have professions or trades or normative trades, occupations. All of these would be attended to by minding humans and horses in specific and particular ways, with varying degrees of passion and feeling both good and bad, both liking and disliking, without the entire bunch of molecules in a population scattering to the four winds unless there was some sort of catastrophic happening say, a nuclear strike?

The advantage of this sort of understanding as paradigmatic for me is that my proselytization of metaphenomenalism as a rubric for research may be clearer when I suggest we jump straight to that point in the 19th century and avoid the word evolution in favour of another model that further enhances this metaphenomenal approach of mine as a quantum philosophy. I prefer a break with our human use of the word evolution partly to clear the conceptual space so as to get started with metaphenomenalist

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Deleuze G, Guattari F, Thousand Plateaus, University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

theory and practice. I would take some of Eric Gerlach's words

Grabbing

Conceptualising

Inferencing

Rationalising

Truth licensing

And I will get to a development of his acknowledgement of Wittgenstein's legacy later on below along with Husserl, Merleau Ponty, and Gestalten psychologists, all wrong but useful. Furthermore the legacy of the modern synthesis in its 1963 version that phenomenalised two words, teleology and teleonomy allows me to add these two words to a metaphor of a minding table with four legs that provide the potential for the worker at the minding table standing on four legs of general interest to us in the modern synthesis of mind as a concept [genetics, epigenetics, telology, and teleonomy] to be used as a working table of the Janus Core, upon which to sketch out [grab], conceptualise, inference, rationalise, and then badge as true, [to be believed in as meaningful and/or real or useful and so on,] what that worker is able to make of such grabbing and so on whilst at the minding table. The worker here is by the way the mind minding in order to do this work, so we could go along with Kuhn here<sup>38</sup>.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> There was a big fuss, rightly imho made by researchers in science and society, so the enlightenment, that became a dialectic between positivism and the study of lived experience [although not stated as

I wish to use this metaphor of a conceptualising table because I can put the baby born onto it and it can be rather like that concept of the blank slate attributed to Locke, but with its four legs metaphenomenalism gets us well past that rather awkward and [naïve] passé nature/nurture argument by treated mind as all there is but as a whole including biology and geology and phenomnea so that even Spinoza is shown to be useful but wrong<sup>39</sup>. Since all the four legs are part of the conceptualising table upon which the baby is put at birth, the baby is now not thrown [it is after all a baby and must be cared for or it dies] necessarily and can be gently placed on the table top if parents so will it and put energy into that will [shades of Nietzsche turning up here, of course]. In its early years the [human] infant will make little progress on its teleonomic leg, which is it's [our] self learning say for now, although it will according to developmental psychology be learning even in the womb, the baby that is. Lakoff's, whom I have mentioned, myelinated neural linkages grown over the days, months, years, by the trainee to peerdom, will speed up the paradigmatic experiences and then examples that are minded about magnified by a staggering 500 times over the processing of novel experiences. However, we know now in the 21st century novel experiences are very much the stuff of brains, of central nervous systems. While growing up and on this metaphorical table the infant may be given, and may take, the

such] and was reported in Adorno T W, 1969, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, Harper Torchbooks, New York, San Francisco, 1976 English translation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Macherey P, Hegel or Spinoza, Uni of Minnesota Press, 1979, 2011.

chance to learn all that is necessary to join in the paradigms [note Kuhn's work/legacy implies a plurality of these shared beliefs in examples that are constantly under pressure as he suggests from developments in and by other paradigms, and of larger and smaller paradigms all none the less operating on common scales of the appearances of phenomena to mindings in various ways. Individuals over generations will learn from teachers/parents, and more for itself if allowed, different forms of knowledge and different skills. Encouraged, and so on according to those variables Kuhn mentions. So, we have a useful metaphor as shown in the diagram, Diagram Three, below.



I used to call this a pedagogic table, but the use of that word causes more arguments between teachers and academics than management and sharing values permit, so I call it the "conceptual table" because the concept is to make progress on sharing the management of minding and understanding becoming these various mindings and paradigms that are now I hope becoming easier to understand as the way we relate to an insouciant energy appearing as specific phenomenalisations. This relates to the existential and action planes I wrote of in Play<sup>40</sup> and inferencing and thus producing the paradigms because of the vocabularies of our behaviours [as by other animals and with other animals who mind differently than we do] in the forms we take and the way we scale to that insouciant energy that has no objects at all per se.

We can theorise the individual on the table is the one shifting from using phenomenalisations it can grab and mind about according to its feelings and concepts that are phenomenalised in part by the individual, so processed much in the way for example Whitehead's and James' legacy<sup>41</sup> allows us to suppose, but without the vitalism, and without the single flow of whatever they thought flowed singly, that was of course the narrative, a great time for novelists and charletons, but is and was for ever and always just the phenomenalisations that appear to us when and if and as minding at the conceptual table.

<sup>40</sup> Thompson B, Play, Paperback ISBN: 9781784564445, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Eisendrath C R, The Unifying Moment, Harvard Uni Press, 1971.

As Lakoff's legacy of work demonstrates it is almost impossible to avoid the education we receive during our infancy and years with our educators of various sorts providing their students with the basic commonly licensed truths -approved of. Searle used the word licensed,<sup>42</sup> which I would like to use as a good word because it links to the axioms and laws Kuhn himself applied to paradigms as a way to add resistance to any simple relativisms that the molecular model of the social sciences seem to have got themselves into using but without any coherent way of suggesting how the person they describe in great detail as having personalities links, to environments they also describe in great detail and thus produce a boxed set as a game in the same way that Wittgenstein ended up doing<sup>43</sup>. Although not quite since he finally realised players were required for any games [but as what?] This of course sets the social scientists scurrying around searching for metaphysical causes, which is where the Copenhagen School still is, in its cul-de-sac<sup>44</sup> paradigm.

Metaphenomenalism and quantum philosophy has the insouciance of pure energy as all the motivation it requires in order to mind forms of biology and forms of geography that combine in various paradigms that do not, cannot stop with just humans, but include all forms as phenomena that appear to mind. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Searle J R, The Construction of Social Reality, Allen Lane, 1995.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Thompson W, The Morphological Construct, in, Architectural Technology Research and Practice, edited by Emmitt S, Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2013, pp.47-62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Zahavi D, Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity, Ohio University Press, 2001 Zahavi D, Subjectivity and Selfhood, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 2005.

metaphenomenal approach suggests an earth, while the paradigms, and the paradigms alone suggest perhaps a real world, held in place by the same energy providing the motivation for all being that is to mind about as on the cover of this book - "If this is the kind of thing you like minding about then you'll like minding about this sort of thing."

In addition, the good part of the metaphenomenal approach are the recent findings, that our central nervous system very much includes plasticity in our learning that has only recently been demonstrated by proof of concept in neuroscience as offering significant learning of knowledge and skills for the teleonomic leg to allow self development in various ways, in varying amounts, at varying times, and in relation to the minding of individuals as well as laws and axioms relating to paradigms. Note however, on this last point of plasticity we must tread carefully and not claim overmuch, although the plasticity has been demonstrated by many neuroscientists, over only the last few decades. Some have claimed too much and too few have claimed enough to make sense of the way individuals can go on learning and altering their experiences and learning right up to the ends of their lives<sup>45</sup>. In all events, individuals often find themselves more, because more, part of a common enough minding within an experience/experiences, rather than in a privileged position. I would very much like to not abandon our human use of such words as culture, society, group, or institution, but remove our

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Eagleman D, Livewired, Canongate, 2020.

belief in their influences, realising these are words used for ease saying of references to points made in sketch form perhaps early on in **transactions** around the conceptual table<sup>46</sup>. For now, let me, allow me to shift us to the conceptual table metaphor upon which the educated user of that table learns to infer, to rationalise, and to adopt truth statements by way of phenomenalising and sharing approval in what any mind [increasingly a metaphenomenal use of that word] would possibly refer to as the correct way [as indeed Hertz and other well established, professional, anthropologists [scientists] suggested<sup>47</sup>]. [There are many issues with leaving the transition from conceptual to knowledge metaphors of the tabletop alone at this point. They must be, should be, and can be profitably left until the basic theory is better understood. But later this plasticity I have mentioned must be shown as vital to the notion and indeed intuition I would say of Kuhn's premise regarding changes in paradigms as the minded workspace from conceptual to deductive relationships between phenomena of all sorts over time as a developmental effect on minds and thus on populations of minds per se.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Wapner S et al, An Organismic Developmental Perspective for Understanding Transactions of Men and Environments, In – Meaning and Behaviour in the Built Environment, Broadbent (ed), Wiley, 1980 pp.79-91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Hertz R, Death and the Right Hand, London, Cohen and West, 1960.